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1 
The Bodies of the Commons: Towards a Relational Embodied Ethics of the 
Commons 
We don’t even know what the body can do 
Spinoza (1677) 
Abstract 
This article extends current theorizations of the ethics of the commons by drawing on feminist 
thought to propose a relational embodied ethics of the commons. Departing from abstract ethical 
principles, the proposed ethical theory reconsiders commoning as a process emerging through 
social actors’ embodied interactions, resulting in the development of an ethics that accounts for 
their shared corporeal concerns. Such theorizing allows for inclusive alternative forms of 
organizing, while offering the ethical and political possibility of countering forms of economic 
competition and addressing the issues of viability that have long bedeviled commoning practices. 
This, we suggest, is achieved in the context of social organizing processes whereby social actors 
are able to reproduce their resource systems and communities based on recognition of their actual 
corporeal vulnerabilities, which drives reciprocity and embodied relationality with the other. 
 





The idea of the commons as material resources (Ostrom 1998, 1999), and the social process of 
‘commoning’ have recently attracted researchers’ and commentators’ attention (Fournier 2013; De 
Angelis 2007; Besson 2017; Meyer and Hudon 2018; Lopes and Tonkinwise 2019). In a global 
economy favoring economic rationalism and individual interests, these are seen as alternatives to 
profit-based appropriation of common resources (Nonini 2006; De Angelis 2007). Critical 
organizational accounts present commoning in terms of reciprocal and relational processes of 
social organizing (Linebaugh 2007; Pedersen 2010; De Angelis and Harvie 2013; Fournier 2013) 
to address such commoning problems. Specifically, Fournier’s (2013) typology of organizing in, 
for, and of the commons stresses communities’ collective efforts to allocate, use, and reproduce 
resources fairly, enabling forms of solidarity economy as alternatives to capitalistic accumulation 
(Federici 2004, 2019). More recently, researchers have also examined alternatives that emerged in 
the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, for example in the empirical settings of reclaimed 
factories (Daskalaki and Kokkinidis 2017) and grassroots exchange networks in Greece (Daskalaki 
et al. 2018), to discuss how collectively performed values may lead to re-articulation of social 
relations and sustainable living in everyday practices. However, commoning initiatives are still 
challenged by unfair practices, such as free-riding, asymmetric competition, and unsustainability 
(Hardin 1968). 
There is agreement that sustaining the commons and addressing the above-mentioned 
problems (Hardin 1968) depend on shared values that underlie ethical norms and guide social 
actors’ interactions (Brown 2006; Bollier and Helfrich 2014; Akrivou and Sison 2016). Yet the 
ethical perspective is largely implicit in the relevant literature, and the corporeal experiences that 
enable social, political, and ethical forms of organizing (Fotaki and Harding 2017; Tyler 2018), 
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such as commoning practices (Müller 2012; Federici 2019), remain largely under-studied in 
commoning accounts. The only explicit references to the issue of the commons in the current 
business ethics literature draw largely on Aristotle’s virtue ethics. This theorization prioritizes the 
soul over the body (Melé 2009, 2012; Sison and Fontrodona 2012) and emphasizes rational ways 
of ethical thinking, acting, and behaving, but ignores embodied experience as a precondition for 
morality, as argued in feminist thought (Gilligan 1982; Noddings 1984; Ettinger 2006; MacKenzie 
and Scully 2007; Butler 2015; author/s). We suggest that relying solely on abstract, disembodied 
rationality to understand the ethics of the commons may lie at the root of failure to provide 
sustainable alternatives to commoning problems. This reliance, we posit, disregards how 
recognizing social actors’ shared corporeal vulnerability may enable reciprocal and relational 
processes of commoning (Ettinger 2006; Butler 2015) that account for these actors’ localized 
ethical dilemmas (Hardin 1968). 
In view of the central but under-studied role of the body in collective forms of political, social, 
and ethical action (Federici 2004, 2019; Butler 2015; Dean and Aune 2015; Tyler 2018) such as 
commoning (Polanyi 1944; Müller 2012, Fournier 2013), we re-theorize the ethics of the commons 
and commoning through the feminist lens of embodied relationality (Fotaki and Harding 2017). 
Specifically, we propose commoning as a feminine process of social organizing (Federici 2009, 
2019), and integrate feminist ideas (Butler 2015; Ettinger 2006) to develop a relational embodied 
ethics of the commons based on recognition of corporeal vulnerability, reciprocity, and embodied 
relationality. This ethics, we suggest, promises to account more fully for social actors’ ethical 
concerns. Our feminist approach politicizes the body (Rahmouni Eldirissi and Courpasson 2019; 
author/s), and addresses its ethical potential to encompass communal processes of social 
reproduction (Federici 2019; Fournier 2013). We argue that such theorization is necessary in an 
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era infused by necrocapitalistic tendencies that sacrifice living matter in exchange for 
commodification, and produce various forms of dispossession, death, and violence (Banerjee 
2008; Sassen 2014) that dehumanize communities. We argue that this understanding might also 
counter problems such as free riding, asymmetric competition for resources, and failures to sustain 
the commons. 
The proposed ethical theory contributes to business ethics debates on the commons (Melé 
2009, 2012; Sison and Fontrodona 2012; Akrivou and Sison 2016), and to critical organizational 
literature on commoning as a process of social organizing (Fournier 2013; Pedersen 2010; Müller 
2012) by linking the three pillars of commoning—organizing in, for, and of the commons (Fournier 
2013)—with feminist embodied ethics. Specifically, we integrate a feminist ethical perspective on 
the body as a source of resistance and knowledge (Butler 2009; Butler, cited in Çetinkaya 2019; 
Ettinger 2006) with feminist political discussions of the commons (Federici 2004, 2009, 2019), 
thus connecting the ethical and political dimensions inherent in social commoning processes 
(Parker 2003). We also extend business ethics debates on forms of relationality that guide ethical 
and sustainable action (Allen et al. 2019; Dey and Steyaert 2016; Painter-Morland et al. 2017; 
Painter-Morland and Slegers 2018; Pérezts et al. 2019), as well as accounts of feminist embodied 
ethics’ usefulness in offering sustainable, inclusive solutions to organizational and social problems 
(Simola 2012; Kenny and Fotaki 2015; Pullen and Rhodes 2015; Fotaki and Harding 2017; Tyler 
2018). 
We use examples from diverse settings (Müller 2012 on urban gardening; Tsavdaroglou 2018 
on refugee collectives) to illustrate the capacity of relational embodied ethics to maintain the 
commons and their communities in ways that counter the aforementioned problems. We also 
identify broader practical implications for commoning, and propose applications of our 
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theorization to urban and digital commons. Finally, we discuss potential limitations of our theory 
and identify directions for future research. 
Commons, Ethics, and Bodies 
Commons and Commoning 
Critical organizational accounts depart from a traditional understanding of the commons as a noun, 
and conceive commoning as a verb or action (Linebaugh 2007). In doing so, these perspectives 
focus on the social and participative processes of organizing and re-producing the commons 
(Fournier 2013; Meyer and Hudon 2018) to benefit community actors and safeguard independence 
from the market (Fuys et al. 2008; Ostrom and Hess 2008). Early economic conceptualizations see 
the commons as limited material resources involving “all the creations of nature and society that 
we inherit jointly and freely and hold in trust for future generations” (Hodkinson 2010, p. 243). 
Examples include fisheries, common grazing and croplands, and natural timber resources in 
communal forests. The traditional economic view limits social understanding of the commons to 
resource allocation, stressing the need for community rules that distinguish users from non-users, 
and specifying conditions for resource allocation (Ostrom 1999; Ostrom and Hess 2008). 
Although organization of the commons is usually based on alternative forms of governance 
beyond governmental and capitalistic imperatives, traditional solutions often appear problematic. 
Ellickson et al. (1995) discuss the ‘tragedy of the commons’ (Hardin 1968) in explaining the 
potential for unfair practices to emerge in commoning efforts, owing to the state’s and private 
owners’ tendency to appropriate common resources. These practices include the free-rider 
problem, whereby community actors lose their motivation to contribute to collective efforts to 
sustain common resources and, driven by personal interests, free ride at the expense of others 
(Hardin 1968). Another challenge is asymmetric competition between actors, manifested in 
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depleting common resources through appropriation for individual interests (Hardin 1968), often 
by engaging in market exchanges. 
To explain why the dilemmas of the commons emerge, researchers traditionally base their 
assumptions on behavioral theories such as the rational decision-making model, bounded 
rationality, heuristics and perceptual biases, as well as individuals’ norm-obedient nature (Ostrom 
1999). Proposed answers to commoning dilemmas center around rationalistic reformulations of 
the rules governing common-pool regimes (Ostrom 1998), or privatization policies that increase 
inequality (Dorling 2015; see also Fotaki and Prasad 2015 in the context of business ethics). Thus, 
although the commons are a terrain of political struggle (Fournier 2013; Federici 2019) to counter 
colonization of the public sphere and ensure independence from the market, their re-appropriation 
for market interests is often unavoidable in capitalistic development. For instance, in relation to 
the kinds of activities that promote flourishing communities, Meyer and Hudon (2017) discuss 
how complementary currency systems may be categorized as ‘social commons’ or ‘commercial 
commons,’ depending on their social and non-profit, or market-driven and profit-oriented focus. 
Such equivocal relationships between the commons and capitalism fail to ensure lasting 
independence from the commercial market logic (De Angelis 2007; Fournier 2013) and inclusion 
of community actors in their own resource allocation. Thus, in the absence of viable alternative 
solutions, community actors are often seen as trapped in a tragedy of their own making (Ostrom 
1999). In his influential discussion of the ‘tragedy of the commons,’ Hardin (1968) states that 
failure to find viable solutions to commoning problems may stem from the fact that we are 
searching for scientific technical solutions to what appears to be a problem of humanity rather than 
a technical problem. He states that most regulations proposed to address commoning problems 
derive from ancient ethical principles, which fail to counter the complexity of a constantly 
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changing world besieged by ecological, economic, social, resource-sharing, and overpopulation 
issues (see also Greco and Floridi 2004 for a related discussion of the Infosphere). 
Seeking more viable alternatives to commoning problems, critical organizational researchers 
emphasize the importance of social processes in commons organization (Linebaugh 2007; Fournier 
2013). These critical accounts attribute the problems of the commons to the prevailing one-
dimensional theorization of the social nature of the commons present in Ostrom’s (1999) 
influential work on economics and governance, which focuses only on resource allocation 
(organizing in common, in Fournier’s 2013 terminology). Overall, mainstream theories of the 
commons almost entirely ignore the importance of values such as reciprocity and relationality that 
are intrinsic aspects of collective human action, as argued in this article. 
To explore these issues, we draw on recent critical accounts of commoning to discuss the 
centrality of relationality and reciprocity to the social processes of commoning (Fournier 2013). 
This discussion allows us to stress the under-studied role of embodiment in this context, 
foregrounding our motivation to use the potential of feminist embodied ethics to develop a 
theoretical framework that offers ethical solutions to the intractable issues of the commons. 
Reciprocity and Relationality in Commoning 
Resonating with critical organizational accounts on commoning (Linebaugh 2007; De Angelis and 
Harvie 2013, Meyer and Houdon 2018), Fournier (2013) offers one of the most comprehensive 
critical understandings of commons and commoning. She suggests that commoning evolves 
around three interdependent axes of social organizing: (i) organizing in common, denoting users’ 
responsibilities for and collective allocation of common resources; (ii) organizing for the common, 
denoting shared consumption and use of the commons; and (iii) organizing of the common, 
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denoting how the commons are constantly re-produced through collective use and reciprocal 
exchanges. 
These critical perspectives do not assume the appropriation of limited material resources. They 
propose a “new commons” without pre-existing rules or clear institutional arrangements (Hess 
2008, p. 1), focusing on the co-creation of resources and communities through shared use, 
reciprocal social contributions (Fournier 2013; Linebaugh 2007; De Angelis and Harvie 2013; 
Meyer and Hudon 2017; Tsavdaroglou 2018), participative management, and jointly developed 
community rules (Coriat 2015). Such social processes are produced by cultivating relations 
between social actors (Meyer and Hudon 2018), which cannot be explained by correlational 
patterns of causality nor fitted into clearly demarcated categories. This relational approach on 
which we build shares some similarities with the processual organizational accounts, which 
challenge the static view of organizations while emphasizing that organizational actors and 
phenomena cannot be reduced to identifiable, immobile entities, but rather are constantly created, 
changed, and constituted by incessant processes of organizing (Weick 1976; Tsoukas and Chia 
2002). Such a processual understanding also recognizes the fluidity and complexity inherent in 
commoning as social organizing (Hernes 2007; Linebaugh 2007), stressing the reciprocal and 
relational processes through which both resources and communities are constantly created and re-
produced, rather than limiting the commons to their material outputs (Fournier 2013). 
In the social process of exchange, usage is not restricted to community actors alone, but may 
be extended to the general public if the latter reciprocate by maintaining services to preserve and 
re-produce the commons rather than using them for commercial or profit-making purposes 
(Fournier 2013). This perspective draws on Lefebvre’s (1991) ‘right to the city’ in 
reconceptualizing commoning as distinguishing between use value and the capitalistic notion of 
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exchange value in allocating and appropriating space (Fournier 2013). For Pedersen (2010), the 
principle of “reciprocity in perpetuity” (p. 151) emphasizes the reciprocal nature of commoning, 
with rules specifying responsible use conditional on conserving resources. Such a view promotes 
a sense of shared responsibility, belonging, togetherness (Martí and Fernández 2015), and 
cooperation among community actors, highlighting both the emergent reciprocity and relationality 
and the inherent ethical underpinnings of commoning processes (Bollier and Helfrich 2014). These 
elements may help avert new forms of exclusion arising from free riding and asymmetric 
competition (Fournier 2013). 
Studies of environmental commons explain the challenges emerging from depletion of natural 
resources in commoning practices (Ostrom et al. 2002) and efforts to build compensatory 
governance structures (Brousseau 2012). Some studies specifically discuss social, intangible 
commons that have a participative governance structure (Defourny and Nyssens 2010), such as 
care for vulnerable populations in need (Holder and Flessas 2008). More recent research considers 
self-managing forms of commoning in crisis-stricken Greece, involving agricultural cooperatives 
and various emerging solidarity economy formations (Karyotis and Kioupkiolis 2015), as well as 
alternative exchange schemes based on horizontal decision making and resource sharing 
(Daskalaki and Kokkinidis 2017). Other studies discuss interrelationships between the 
sociomaterial world, values, and ethics (Allen et al. 2019), as well as subjectivity, power, and 
freedom practices as critical ethical alternatives to neoliberal pressures (Dey and Steyaert 2016). 
In relation to urban commons, some authors consider cities as spaces of relationality and density 
made viable through collective use (Borch and Kornberger 2015). Recent studies also examine 
digital communities’ particular forms of organizing, and ethical dilemmas arising from expansion 
of the digital space (Greco and Floridi 2004). Overall, the relational and reciprocal forms of 
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organizing to which these works allude may involve mobilizing values and re-articulating social 
relations and sustainable living outside market exchanges (Daskalaki et al. 2018), thereby offering 
viable counter-responses (Fuys et al. 2008) to both private accumulation and state ownership. 
The importance of relationality for organizing (Cooper 2005), values, and ethics (Painter-
Morland and Slegers 2018; Pérezts et al. 2019) is widely acknowledged. Scholars also recognize 
the central role of embodiment in the creation of ethical relational spaces among individuals 
(Ladkin 2012; Tyler 2018; Bell and Vachhani 2019). In particular, feminist understandings of 
relationality recognize “both individuality and relatedness, both separation and connection, in co-
creation and in tension with each other” (Nelson 2001, p. 143, cited in Fotaki and Prasad 2015), 
while also considering the importance of reciprocity for ethics. Relational feminist accounts stress 
how reciprocity and relationality develop by recognizing mutual dependence and accountability 
between the embodied self and the other (Butler 2015; Ettinger 2006). Departing from abstract 
norms imposed on bodies, such approaches counter universalistic ideas of personal responsibility, 
and reframe the notions of responsibility, ethics, and values in relation to the other. This reframing, 
we suggest, is particularly relevant and urgent for commoning practices, as a tool to re-evaluate 
the societal impact of collective forms of organizing and identify sustainable alternatives to 
capitalism (Fotaki and Prasad 2015). In an era when globalized capitalism creates new inequalities 
and new forms of dispossession (Sassen 2014; author/s), such approaches may also propose 
meaningful forms of embodied resistance, as accounted for by transnational feminism and 
postcolonial ethics (Mohanty 2003; Fernandes 2013). 
Adopting this feminist angle may thus allow better understanding of how the reciprocal and 
relational practices of commoning drive moral responsiveness (Painter-Morland and Slegers 
2018), by considering how these practices are actually embodied. In the next sub-section, we 
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discuss the primacy of the body in relational and reciprocal forms of social, political, and ethical 
action (Müller 2012, Federici 2009; Butler 2015), such as commoning (Fournier 2013). 
Embodiment in Commoning 
There is a consensus that commoning relies on shared values, norms, moral principles (Bollier and 
Helfrich 2014; De Angelis and Harvie 2013), and respect for the ethics of community living to 
promote individual and collective growth (Haugh 2007; Melé 2009, 2012; Peredo and Chrisman 
2006). Yet these issues are considered mainly in the context of participative social organizing. As 
already stated, business ethics accounts of the commons draw mainly on Aristotelian virtue ethics, 
arguing that citizens are the soul of the polis, which, as in all animals, is superordinate to the body 
(Aristotle 1988, section 1291a). Sison and Fontrodona (2012) explain how community actors 
promote the common good through virtuous labor and developing other members’ moral sense, 
rather than being concerned merely with their own interests. Melé’s (2009) ‘personalist’ and 
‘common good’ principles emphasize that ethical duties of respect, care, and human dignity in 
cooperative relations are necessary for societies to flourish. Akrivou and Sison (2016) draw on 
Aristotelian ethics to discuss historical relationships between human dignity, virtues, and 
capitalism and explain how the common good is created. These Aristotelian-inspired approaches 
recognize that in a well-functioning society, citizens must lead good lives. However, in 
emphasizing the superiority of the mind and psyche over the body, such views tend to reproduce 
dualities and encourage abstract classifications (Hernes 2007) of ethical phenomena, disregarding 
the actual ethical experiences of living human bodies. 
Overall, “there is notorious disregard for the role of embodiment, affect and emotion in the 
study of social movements and political mobilization” (Dean and Aune 2015, p. 376). 
Nevertheless, these are important aspects of alternative commoning initiatives, such as the 
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Zapatistas in Chiapas, Mexico (cited in Federici 2019), and the Rojava model of governance of 
Kurds in Northern Syria (Tax 2016) fighting for gender equality and caring for the environment. 
The politics of commoning is not simply a mind-driven technical management of resources in 
space, but a struggle to perform common, livable relations in real time (Velicu and Garcia-Lopez 
2018) in the context of actors’ reciprocal political and ethical processes of becoming 
(Tsavdaroglou 2018; Butler 2015). Indeed, some notable exceptions in the commoning literature 
challenge the duality of body and mind, and see commoning as an embodied process, often 
involving physical activity such as touching, tending, and caring. These accounts explain how 
commoning emerges and develops through collaborative everyday practices that counter 
capitalistic individualism (Müller 2012; Federici 2019). We must therefore pay attention to the 
corporeal dynamics of “both anguish and excitement that we embody in our proximities or 
relations” with others (Velicu and Garcia-Lopez 2018, p. 62), and rethink how our bodies can be 
used for collective resistance (Butler 2015). 
Drawing on feminist accounts, we suggest that this can be done by understanding the social, 
political, and ethical organizing of the commons (Fournier 2013) from the novel angle of embodied 
relationality developed by Fotaki and Harding (2017). We extend the latter and integrate insights 
from feminist embodied ethics (Butler 2015, 2009; Ettinger 2006) to develop our theoretical 
proposition of a relational embodied ethics of the commons. We argue that traditional economic 
and universalistic approaches to commoning are problematic in taking a rational view of the 
phenomenon (Federici 2009). Unlike the proposed feminist angle, which focuses on the body, the 
traditional view focuses on normative regulations and abstract ethical principles, which disregard 
how social actors’ experiences, affects, and embodied practices may shape the ethical, social, and 
political processes of commoning (Müller 2012; Federici 2009). Building on the above-mentioned 
13 
critical discussions of commoning (De Angelis 2007; Müller 2012; Fournier 2013), we suggest 
that recognizing actors’ actual corporeal vulnerabilities (Butler 2015; Kenny and Fotaki 2015; 
Pullen and Rhodes 2015) may enable locally relevant ethical interactions and mobilizations of 
resistance against normative expectations (Butler 2015), based on reciprocity and relationality 
(Butler 2009; Ettinger 2006). 
Our proposed embodied angle also accords with recent organizational debates on the 
inescapable role of the body in all expressions of ethical, social, and political life, and the need to 
further integrate corporeal vulnerability into business ethics research (Fotaki and Harding 2017; 
Tyler 2018; Bell and Vachhani 2019). While some accounts discuss bodies’ compliance with 
normative discourses (Courpasson and Monties 2017), others argue for the relational potential of 
vulnerable bodies to overcome this normativity (Fotaki and Harding 2017; Tyler 2018; Doughty 
and Murray 2016; author/s). Bodies are also sites of both docility and resistance, as the political 
effect of vulnerability emerges at the intersection of the two (Rahmouni Elidrissi and Courpasson 
2019). Specifically, this vulnerability “materializes a physical limit that forces people to take a 
stance” (ibid., p. 2) to resist the normative regulations imposed on their bodies. Bodies are already 
recognized as inherently precarious and vulnerable in health and social care contexts (Rogers et 
al. 2012; Herring 2016), but not yet in the business ethics, management, and organization studies 
literature. However, this may be changing, as researchers are inspired by feminist embodied ethics, 
and particularly Judith Butler’s ideas on corporeal vulnerability, to position ethical and political 
collective action at the centre of philosophy of the body (Fotaki and Harding 2017; Tyler 2018; 
author/s). 
In this article, we adopt this feminist embodied angle in arguing for a need to consider the 
political and ethical effect of vulnerable bodies (Butler 2015; Ettinger 2006) bound together to 
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perform collaborative processes of resistance against the dominant political and economic order 
(Butler 2009; Federici 2019). In developing our framework, we take inspiration from the work of 
another prominent feminist, Silvia Federici, who stresses that there is “no commons without 
community” (Federici 2019, p. xvi). Federici emphasizes the need to bring social actors’ bodies 
together to build the social fabric through which resources and communities are constantly 
organized and sustained through shared use and cultural exchanges (Federici 2019). In her 
discussion, Federici argues against rational conceptions of femininity that conceive women as the 
commons of men, and criticizes capitalism for treating women’s bodies as labor-producing 
machines (Federici 2019). She advocates a feminist perspective on commoning that visibilizes 
women’s historically leading role in communal social movements (Federici 2004; Podlashuc 
2009), and considers women’s traditional contributions to the house: “the oikos on which economy 
is built” (Federici 2009, p. 138). Women both create new lives and build social structures that, 
through care (author/s), can sustain new, powerful forms of community reproduction. Federici thus 
proposes that creating the commons be made a task of women. Both men and women must 
construct communities that break down gender stereotypes and find meaningful ways to reproduce 
themselves, without causing suffering to the other, but rather enabling “the production of 
themselves as common subjects” (Federici 2009, p. 136). Federici also condemns capitalism for 
exposing human vulnerabilities by “waging a war against our bodies, making it a signifier for all 
that is limited, material, and opposed to reason.” (Federici, 2019, p. 190). Capitalism suppresses 
our capacity to satisfy basic bodily needs such as “the need for the sun, the wind, the sky, the need 
for touching…and being in the open air, instead of being surrounded by closed walls” (ibid.). 
Stressing the embodied aspect of reproduction, with all its inherent vulnerabilities, as a political 
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resource, Federici’s work uniquely motivates our theoretical development of a relational embodied 
ethics of the commons. 
Next, we review the literature relating to the need to reconsider organizational ethics from a 
feminist embodied perspective. This foregrounds our theoretical proposition of a relational 
embodied ethics of the commons as a new form of organizational ethics that counters the 
aforementioned problems of the commons and commoning. 
Embodied Ethics, Organizations, and Commoning 
Embodied Organizational Ethics 
Organizational scholars stress the need to draw on feminist embodied accounts to rethink 
organizational ethics as an embodied process (e.g., Pullen and Rhodes 2014, 2015; Thanem and 
Wallenberg 2015; Hancock 2008; Kenny and Fotaki 2015; Tyler 2018). This embodied approach 
is often contrasted with the codified universalizing ethical principles that dominate human passions 
by privileging consciousness (Deleuze 1988). Classic ethics (including Kantian, utilitarian and, to 
a degree, virtue ethics) favor rules over human interactions (Loacker and Muhr 2009), thinking 
over feeling and becoming (Pullen and Rhodes 2015), and pre-existing rational convictions that 
disregard bodily experiences (Borgerson 2007). For instance, Pullen and Rhodes (2010) argue that 
masculine conceptions of gender cast a mantle over the body that prevents the emergence of 
genuine corporeal connections. Using Hamington’s (2004) theory of ‘embodied care,’ Simola 
(2012) proposes a feminist ethics perspective capable of driving cognitive decisions around 
sustainable responses to human aspects of business practices. Poldner et al. (2019) view the body 
as a critical source, sensor, and processor of entrepreneurs’ ethical experiences, informing their 
moral decisions and actions, while Atkins and Parker (2012) posit the body as the main vehicle 
through which social entrepreneurs feel, understand, and respond ethically to environmental needs. 
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Embodied ethics accounts discuss the body as a medium for communicating and relating to others 
(Quinn and Dutton 2005), and argue that forming ethical subjects requires actual bodily 
experiences of ethical dilemmas (Skinner 2012). 
In discussing the usefulness of feminism for re-theorizing organizations, Fotaki and Harding 
(2017) suggest a new organizational ethics based on embodied relationality as a way to promote 
collective political action, for instance to counter extractivism and expulsion (author/s 
forthcoming). Such feminist accounts focus on women’s moral corporeal experiences (Derry 
2002), and call for relationships between affect, gender, and power to be rethought, recognizing 
the ability of different other bodies to connect openly beyond ‘bounded rationality’ (Hancock 
2008; Pullen and Rhodes 2010). They call for a better understanding of our processual becoming 
in relation to other bodies, to develop embodied experiences that may act as references for future 
ethical action (Poldner et al. 2019). Thus, the relevance of feminist embodied ethics goes beyond 
the duration of local corporeal encounters. Such encounters may be viscerally and sensorially 
registered, and thus retrieved and reproduced to shape ethical subjects’ future decisions and 
interactions with unknown others in different contexts (Ettinger 2006). 
Overall, rethinking the ethics of commoning through a feminist embodied lens challenges 
traditional conceptions of commoning as a technical, rational process by rehabilitating the 
experience of the body as a source of knowing. This understanding attends to how social actors 
embody their ethical dilemmas in their local contexts to develop reciprocal and relational ethical 
interactions that resist the abstract, disembodied, normative rules (Gilligan 1982; Jaggar 1992) 
imposed on them by a distanced humanistic perspective (Thanem and Knights 2019). Such an 
ethical approach also proposes ethicality as an embodied “work in progress” (Poldner et al. 2019, 
p. 26) enacted through fluid, complex and conflated practices and processes in the making and 
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becoming (Ettinger 2006; Hernes 2007). This embodied perspective, we suggest, helps resist 
capitalistic normative pressures, which tend to commodify social actors’ embodied experiences in 
the practices of commoning (Federici 2019). We argue that we cannot understand how commoning 
initiatives work without examining how their participants interact and relate to each other through 
their living bodies. Hence, we focus on embodied expressions of relationality and reciprocity as 
ways to enhance communities’ chances of survival (McNeill 2008; Fournier 2013). 
Next, we draw on the eclectic ideas of feminist philosophers, Judith Butler and Bracha 
Ettinger, and on Fotaki and Harding’s (2017) organizational ethics of embodied relationality to 
develop our theory of a relational embodied ethics of the commons. This allows us to develop and 
define each of our theory’s three underlying pillars—recognition of corporeal vulnerability, 
reciprocity, and embodied relationality— and to explain their interdependencies and how they 
inform each other to enable meaningful community collaboration. We first present Butler’s ideas 
to develop and define the notions of recognition of corporeal vulnerability and reciprocity. We 
then combine this understanding with Ettinger’s theory of the matrixial and Fotaki and Harding’s 
organizational theorization of it to develop and define the notion of embodied relationality. A 
combined discussion of these three pillars supports our theoretical proposition of a relational 
embodied ethics of the commons. 
Feminist Embodied Ethics for a Relational Embodied Ethics of the Commons 
Recognition of Corporeal Vulnerability and Reciprocity 
At the core of Butler’s philosophy lies consideration of corporeal vulnerability as a precondition 
for ethics. Butler suggests that our corporeal vulnerability “binds us to those whom we may well 
not know, and whom we have never chosen” (2011, p. 384). Thus, our bodies are interdependent 
and able to counter threats in our collective social, political, and ethical encounters (Butler 2015). 
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In her performative theory of assembly, Butler argues that assemblies can only be built on the basis 
of corporeal recognition of vulnerability, reciprocity, and relationality, which associate ethics with 
politics in a space where bodies perform a “collective thereness” (Butler 2015, p. 197). Butler 
conceives an assembly in terms of an “embodied and plural performativity” (ibid., p. 8), suggesting 
different ways of being together, literally and symbolically, “to enact a message performatively” 
(ibid., p. 197). Her theory is that rethinking inclusion as a political, ethical, and embodied process 
counters normative conceptions of inclusion that suppress difference, stressing the body’s capacity 
to alter norms and transform social realities (Butler 2004). 
In discussing our dependence on organizational practices, such as using and regenerating 
resources, Butler calls for consideration of communities’ potential to act as “spaces of sociality” 
(Butler 2015, p. 84), where social organizing evolves in a spirit of reciprocity rather than of 
individual benefit. Butler’s theory explains how individuals’ embodied dependence on the ‘other’ 
stems from a need for mutual recognition of our human existence as co-constituted in a wider 
social context, which also causes our obedience to normative systems (Butler 1990). Butler and 
Athanasiou (2013) also observe that social dispossession and self-dispossession (as performances 
of identity) are intertwined, creating conditions of shared vulnerability. Velicu and Garcia-Lopez 
(2018, p. 62) draw on these social, subjective, and political aspects of dispossession to re-theorize 
commoning as “constitutive relations in performing ourselves, which are also contingent, 
emotional and rather opaque processes of self-formation.” They argue that this “demands a non-
violent politics which considers transformation and production of norms as open (ontologically 
and epistemologically) to what is foreign, unknown, uncertain, or unborn yet” (ibid., p. 64). Tyler 
(2018) draws on Butler’s (2015) theory of assembly to stress the potential of feminist embodied 
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ethics to promote meaningful forms of inclusion in organizing activism, which is based on mutual 
recognition of difference beyond normative expectations. 
These ideas seem particularly relevant to the context of daily commoning processes, where 
disembodied capitalistic norms expose social actors’ corporeal vulnerabilities (Federici 2019). 
While not all forms of commoning are explicitly about resistance, they are nevertheless concerned 
with counteracting privatization and encroachment of the public space. Butler’s ideas are useful 
for understanding the political effect of recognizing corporeal vulnerability, resulting in the 
creation of relational and reciprocal forms of social commoning that counter asymmetric forms of 
competition. Looking across levels reveals the ways in which social processes interact with the 
corporeal vulnerability that individuals experience. This allows us to theorize how actors’ mutual 
reliance on each other’s embodied contributions ensures community survival.  
Drawing on Butler, we see corporeal vulnerability as a state of existential precarity extending 
beyond injury and death, as an “endless possibility of experiencing injury and the shared fears 
about our own survivability” (Fotaki and Harding 2017, p. 144; Butler 2004). For Butler, 
precariousness is “a generalized condition [which] relies on a conception of the body as 
fundamentally dependent on, and conditioned by, a sustained and sustainable world” (Butler, cited 
in Çetinkaya 2019). This state is further exposed by capitalism (Federici 2019), and by lack of 
social and political support (Butler 2004, 2009), leading us to rely on and relate with others for 
survival. We suggest that recognizing our own vulnerability may compel us to intermingle these 
sensations with those of others’ human bodies to develop a sense of shared vulnerability. This 
shared understanding may have a political effect in urging social actors to question and challenge 
their habitual normative practices, making them aware of their ability to sustain other bodies, 
resources and communities, and to relate with each other reciprocally to resist the abstract 
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regulations imposed on their ‘common’ bodies (understood here as the ‘bodies of the commons’). 
Such shifts require an embodied understanding of reciprocity in commoning, as mutually 
beneficial exchanges of (im)material resources, values, support, and care based on embodied 
relational processes of common reliance. 
We now turn to Ettinger’s philosophy to expand on the ideas of ethical relationality inherent 
in the social, political, and ethical organizing of the commons (Pedersen 2010; Müller 2012; 
Fournier 2013) and develop the notion of embodied relationality. 
Embodied Relationality 
Ettinger’s theory of subjectivity focuses on the inseparable connection of the matrixial I with the 
non-I (other/(m)other), using the metaphor of relational co-existence in the womb. In this co-
existence, “partial-subjects co-emerge and co-fade through returning and transformation via 
external/internal border-links with-in and with-out” (Ettinger 2006, p. 84, cited in Fotaki and 
Harding 2017). For Ettinger, in giving life to the other, the woman’s body creates the ethical 
possibility of partial subjects ‘becoming together’ while cohabiting in the womb (Ettinger 2006). 
This cohabitation relies on subjects opening up in a process that Ettinger conceives as “self-
fragilization,” to make space for ethical encounters with vulnerable others without traumatizing 
them (Ettinger 2010, cited in Fotaki and Harding 2017, p. 152). The idea of the ‘matrixial,’ where 
such encounters happen, is thus conceived as a space of affective co-existence and reciprocity 
between the feminine and the masculine, countering dominating and exclusionary power 
dynamics, and promoting a feeling of ‘being-with’ the other. In this space, the I and the non-I co-
exist to shape their subjectivities, which Ettinger calls the “matrixial stratum of subjectivization” 
(Ettinger 1996, pp. 125-6). This explains how embodied encounters activate sensing and 
understanding of the social world to enhance awareness and consciousness of subjects’ shared 
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ethical concerns. Ettinger also posits that these maternal links remain in the subject’s psyche 
through memory, and are carried throughout life, shaping future ethical interactions with unknown 
others. These processes are not exclusive to women’s experiences but apply equally to all subjects, 
regardless of gender (Ettinger 2006). 
With reference to Ettinger’s theory of the matrixial, Kenny and Fotaki (2015) develop an 
organizational ethics that reconciles the psyche with the body, in a shared borderspace where 
compassionate and inclusive relationships based on acceptance and care for the ‘unknown,’ 
irreducible other are possible. Fotaki and Harding (2017) propose a new organizational ethics 
based on embodied relationality as a precondition for our symbolic and literal survival (p. 144) 
amid the exclusionary tendencies of capitalism. We build on these developments by demonstrating 
how Ettinger’s proposition of an embodied, compassionate relational ethics may inspire new 
possibilities for communities and organizations suffering the consequences of oppression and 
exclusion, where differences between the self and the other are lost in ever-increasing social 
dispossession. This perspective suggests a reframing of social actors’ subjectivities in relational 
terms, not as separate from one another. 
In reading Ettinger through Butler and extending Fotaki and Harding (2017), we understand 
embodied relationality as an ethical process emerging through social actors’ mutual recognition of 
shared vulnerabilities, and reliance on reciprocal practical contributions that account for their 
actual corporeal, localized need for interdependence. In our theory development, Ettinger’s ideas 
are used to stress the partial nature of the vulnerable subject reliant on a non-exclusionary and non-
traumatizing embodied ethical relationship with the other (Fotaki and Harding 2017). Butler’s 
recent work discussed previously, allows us to consider this ethical relationship as a reciprocal 
social condition emerging from recognizing subjects’ shared vulnerability and precariousness, 
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stressing communities’ performative potential to drive inclusive social, ethical, and political 
action. 
These combined perspectives allow us to propose a relational embodied ethics of the 
commons, based on recognition of corporeal vulnerability, reciprocity, and embodied 
relationality, as symbolic, interdependent elements at the heart of the social process of commoning 
(Linebaugh 2007; Fournier 2013; Müller 2012). We propose that recognizing the vulnerability of 
the lived body and how this guides reciprocity and relationality with other bodies (Ettinger 2006; 
Butler 2015) alters the view of the body as an object of primitive capitalistic accumulation 
(Federici 2009). We emphasize the political potential for social actors’ bodies to collectively 
disrupt the dominant order, while enabling reciprocal and relational alternative forms of 
community collaboration and reproduction that account for their actual ethical demands. Such 
ethical relationships are transformative, going beyond embodied encounters of vulnerability 
through exposure to potential injury or death, to become references that shape subjects’ future 
ethical interactions with unknown others in the social spaces of commoning (Poldner et al. 2019). 
As illustrated in the examples below, this embodied perspective may be essential for developing 
cohesive communities that are able to sustain the continuous social processes of allocation, use, 
and regeneration of commons and communities (organizing in, of, and for the commons; Fournier 
2013) against the intractable issues of the commons. 
Furthermore, in discussing how recognition of one’s vulnerability is projected onto the other’s 
body to drive reciprocal and relational community mobilization, our post-structuralist feminist 
approach proposes ethical community action spanning individual, collective (Vachhani and Pullen 
2019), and organizational levels of analysis. We propose an onto-epistemological understanding 
that emphasizes the materially embodied collective processes of “knowing in being” (Barad 2003, 
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p. 829), through which temporal, spatial, material, and symbolic boundaries in ethical and political 
struggles of commoning are constantly changed, conflated, blurred, reproduced, and reconfigured 
(Weick 1976; Hernes 2007). This approach acknowledges the impossibility of fitting the theorized 
embodied relational processes of commoning into generalizable, context-dependent patterns of 
ethical behaviour (Hernes 2007; Thanem and Knights 2019), and stresses the intertwining of mind 
and body, as manifested in various practices of care. Our theory therefore highlights the central 
role of the body in shaping consciousness and awareness of localized ethical experiences (Ettinger 
2006; Poldner et al. 2019; author/s) of commoning in different contexts. 
This relational embodied ethics of the commons is not based on a naturalistic conception of 
femininity (Ettinger 2006; Federici 2019). Rather, our theory stresses the need to consider feminist 
values surrounding women’s historical community reproductive work (e.g., creation of spaces for 
communal cooking and schooling), which have allowed them to sustain communal structures 
based on care and responsibility for the natural and human resources involved in commoning 
practices (Federici 2019). The underlying principle is that neither commons nor communities are 
possible unless we stop seeing ourselves as independent of each other (Ettinger 2006) and refuse 
to build our lives on the suffering of others (Butler 2015; Federici 2019). Such an understanding, 
we suggest, can inspire all human beings to reproduce themselves as equals (Federici 2019) 
through reciprocal, relational forms of collective allocation, use, and regeneration of common 
resources independent of the market. Figure 1 depicts relationships between the concepts of our 
proposed theory across different levels of analysis, their association with the previously discussed 
theoretical frameworks, and the emerging implications. 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
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Below, we present two commoning examples that demonstrate the political and ethical 
potential of the proposed relational embodied ethics of the commons. 
Illustrative Examples 
Refugee Communities 
The first example relates to Tsavdaroglou’s (2018) identification of a need to protect refugees and 
forced migrants from inhuman conditions in state-run refugee camps. This is a major factor guiding 
refugees’ and civil society actors’ collective efforts to occupy abandoned buildings for community 
living independent of the state. Tsavdaroglou explains that social actors develop self-organized 
structures based on the principles of anti-racism, anti-hierarchy, horizontal organization, mutual 
respect, openness to difference, reciprocity, equality, freedom, inclusion, and collective sharing, 
whereby people from different national, social, age, and gender backgrounds physically co-exist 
(Tsavdaroglou 2018). Individuals engage in embodied recreational activities by doing things 
together, such as sports, poetry, music, theatre classes, and performances, often in small and 
limited spaces, where they freely express their gendered identities and distinct cultural practices 
(Tsavdaroglou 2018). They feel free (Tsavdaroglou 2018), “better than being locked up in military 
camps” (ibid., p. 387) and realize that “only united we can be strong” (ibid, p. 390). These 
communities become ‘spaces of sociality’ (Butler 2015), where private and public life interfuse. 
The personal becomes political, and through collective embodied resistance, refugees “take the 
buildings in their hands” (Tsavdaroglou 2018, p. 389) to defend them from the state’s exclusionary 
tendencies. 
Tsavdaroglou draws particularly on Lefebvre’s ‘right to the city’ to explain that refugees 
understand these spaces for their use value as opposed to their exchange value, recognizing the 
need to refrain from market exchanges in order to protect their communities. With the help of civil-
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society actors, refugees collectively define their duties and responsibilities, such as mixed shifts 
for cleaning and cooking (Tsavdaroglou 2018), to allocate their common resources (organizing in 
common; Fournier 2013). They also collectively decide on the conditions for using their common 
resources, such as food, medicines, and common spaces, and agree on the need to use these 
reciprocally with care in their embodied activities (Pedersen 2010; organizing of the commons; 
Fournier 2013) in order to avoid depleting them (Tsavdaroglou 2018). As they realize their 
dependence on each other, refugees also engage in joint activities to ensure regeneration of their 
resources and the re-establishment of their communities (organizing for the commons; Fournier 
2013). Women and men are treated as equals, and there is respect for privacy, alongside enhanced 
awareness of people’s dependence on each other’s presence and reciprocal contributions. For 
instance, people can always seek physical protection from each other when they feel afraid, but 
can also be alone when they wish (Tsavdaroglou 2018). Social actors may also disrupt the gender 
binary and other hierarchical divisions, as indicated in studies of various grassroots solidarity 
movements in Greece (Kouki and Chatzidakis forthcoming). 
Reading the example through our proposed theory, we suggest that these communities emerge 
from recognizing refugees’ and civil society actors’ shared precariousness (Butler 2015), and 
specifically their corporeal vulnerability (Butler 2009; Ettinger 2006). Refugees come to recognize 
their shared predicament, irrespective of religious, ethnic, and other differences. They realize that 
their shared vulnerability can only be protected by relating with the unknown but openly accepted 
other under conditions of precariousness (Butler 2004, 2009). In this process, they understand 
themselves as ‘partial subjects’ dependent on reciprocal exchanges and embodied relationality 
(Ettinger 2006), as discussed above. As they emerge from their embodied experiences in limited 
spaces under conditions of precarity, these ethical relationships enhance a sense of community 
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belonging and interdependence. This heightens social actors’ awareness of the need for fair 
allocation of and reciprocal participation in the use and reproduction of their material and 
intellectual resources (organizing in, of, and for the commons; Fournier 2013) to ensure 
community survival. Of course, these spaces are not conflict-free, as competition for scarce 
resources may still be present; but conflict can be avoided when these communities openly 
embrace existing and emerging tensions in an agonistic (Mouffe 2005) rather than antagonistic 
manner. Butler’s (2015) theory of assembly indicates how this ethical relational space may trigger 
collective action infused with political energy, as refugees’ bodies connect with each other to enact 
their messages performatively in the context of daily practices intended to counter the oppressive 
tendencies of the state (Tsavdargolou 2018). 
This example might be seen as a relatively short-lived initiative, but the logic of the temporary 
commons also applies to other forms of community relationships fostered through collaborations 
and encounters between different actors (Mathews 2010). Whether or not such initiatives are short-
lived may also depend on support from civil society and other actors, as well as the state’s role in 
regulating the commons, as briefly discussed in our example. Yet, as we illustrate in our second 
example below, the proposed relational embodied ethics might also enable and sustain daily 
commoning practices in less intense situations where humans’ interact closely, such as urban 
gardening. 
Urban Gardening 
Müller (2012) presents the example of German urban gardening communities, which are becoming 
increasingly visible in daily life. In her analysis, she discusses urban gardens as promising 
alternatives that allow communities to control their food production independently of the market 
(Müller 2012), and as spaces of solidarity where private and public life intertwine. Citizens join 
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forces and rely on “hands-on neighbourhood support” (ibid., p. 1) to politically defend public 
spaces in favor of community flourishing. They do so through collective embodied activities in 
close proximity, including keeping bees, creating cosmetics, hosting gardening workshops, and 
transforming city spaces into sites for community events and plant growing, as well as organizing 
social encounters such as open meals. Federici (2019, p. 105) also discusses the importance of 
urban gardens in the “rurbanization” process, echoing Fernandez’s (2003) view of urban gardens 
as spaces that reinforce community cohesion, where people have the opportunity to socialize and 
exchange cultural knowledge through collective gardening and reciprocal recreational activities 
that go beyond food production (e.g., celebrations, playing cards). Such social processes nurture a 
spirit of reciprocal giving and cultural and knowledge exchanges that overcome individual 
resource scarcity, allowing actors to benefit from each other’s contributions for the sustainable use 
and re-production of their resources and communities (Müller 2012). Müller describes urban 
gardens as self-organized structures that provide a refuge for the vulnerable, exhausted self and 
offer an antidote to the rapidity and ease of capitalist societies. She particularly emphasizes the 
interconnected nature of body and mind, suggesting that embodied gardening activities urge social 
actors to connect and cooperate with each other based on principles of multicultural openness, 
reciprocity, and collective involvement in community labor, as well as cooperation with and 
attention to each other. This is the opposite of capitalist competition, individualism, and 
consumption (Müller 2012). 
Analyzed in the light of our proposed theory, this example illustrates how corporeal 
recognition of vulnerability, described here as inherent to human existence and further exposed by 
capitalism (Federici 2019), has a performative political effect (Butler 2015), motivating gardening 
practices that contend for public space for community welfare. We argue that these collaborative 
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commoning processes emerge as social actors recognize their mutual dependence on each other’s 
practical, embodied contributions for community survival (Ettinger 2006). In other words, actors 
realize that urban gardens’ sustenance depends on relational and reciprocal reproductive processes, 
respect for the conditions of use of their commons resources, and collective use based on care and 
responsibility (Pedersen 2010). This embodied ethical space of interdependence enhances a sense 
of community belonging (Fernandez 2003; Martí and Fernández 2015) and a spirit of relationality, 
cooperation, and reciprocity among gardeners by opposing capitalist individualism (Müller 2012). 
Such an ethical understanding might thus enable sustainable alternative forms of commoning 
(Müller 2012) for allocating (organizing in common), using (organizing for the common), and 
regenerating common resources and communities (organizing of the common; Fournier 2013) 
independently of the state. 
The two examples above illustrate the emancipatory potential of embodied relational ethics 
for communities’ sustainable living, as the latter is informed by interdependencies in social actors’ 
reciprocal, relational, embodied, cognitive, and environmental shared resources (Fotaki and 
Harding 2017). Through our theoretical development and the supporting examples, we argue that 
basing our understanding solely on economic and/or universalistic ethical perspectives limits our 
ability to provide ethical and sustainable counter-responses to commoning problems. This is 
because such conceptions seek technical, rationalistic solutions, which often condition actors to 
think about individual benefits at the expense of community survival, thus potentially perpetuating 
free riding and asymmetric competition. They fail to consider how vulnerable bodies’ mutual 
interdependence for survival informs social actors’ ethical interactions on the basis of reciprocity 
and relationality, which sustain the daily social organizing of the commons and communities. 
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Discussion 
In this article, we draw on feminist embodied ethics to challenge economic and universalistic 
ethical conceptualizations of commoning that view actors predominantly as rational agents 
(Ostrom 1999). Such conceptualizations, in our view, lie at the heart of problematic answers to 
commoning dilemmas (Fournier 2013). Instead, we respond to calls to adopt a humanistic ethical 
perspective on commoning (Hardin 1968), and to rethink commoning as a feminist process of 
social organizing (Federici 2009). We combine insights from feminist philosophers (Ettinger 2006; 
Butler 2015) and build on the notion of embodied relationality (Fotaki and Harding 2017) to 
propose a relational embodied ethics of the commons that considers how social actors’ shared 
corporeal vulnerabilities may trigger commoning processes based on reciprocity and relationality. 
This ethical approach counters tendencies for free riding and asymmetric competition, with a view 
to enhancing communities’ sustainable living. We thus make specific contributions to the theory 
and practice of commoning. We also acknowledge certain limitations, and suggest directions for 
future research. 
Theoretical Contributions 
First, our theory contributes a novel perspective on current business ethics debates on the 
commons, which to date have been heavily inspired by Aristotelian virtue ethics that prioritize the 
mind over the body (Melé 2009, 2012; Sison and Fontrodona 2012; Akrivou and Sison 2016). In 
discussing how relating reciprocally through the body informs knowledge and ethical decisions 
through processes in the making and becoming (Ettinger 2006; Butler, 2015), we stress the mutual 
co-existence of and interdependence between the thinking mind and the feeling body (Poldner et 
al. 2019). This understanding addresses calls to rethink organizational ethics from a feminist 
embodied perspective, to enable decision making around sustainable organizational practices 
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(Simola 2012) and to challenge dominant discourses that emphasize mind-driven ethical action 
and disembodied capitalistic logics (Kenny and Fotaki 2015; Pullen and Rhodes 2015; Fotaki and 
Harding 2017; Tyler 2018; Poldner et al. 2019; Thanem and Knights 2019). Bringing an embodied 
perspective of relationality and reciprocity to the ethical processes of commoning also contributes 
to current business ethics debates on relationships between the sociomaterial world, values, and 
ethics for sustainable action (Allen et al. 2019; Dey and Steyaert 2016; Painter-Morland et al. 
2017; Painter-Morland and Slegers 2018; Pérezts et al. 2019). 
Second, our theory contributes to current critical organizational literature on the commons 
(De Angelis 2007; Linebaugh 2007; Pedersen 2010; Fournier 2013; Müller 2012; Daskalaki et al. 
2018; Velicu and Garcia-Lopez 2018) by arguing that, to fully understand the social, political and 
ethical processes sustaining commoning, we must pay attention to social actors’ shared corporeal 
experiences. We specifically contribute to Fournier’s theorization of commoning as social 
organizing by showing how corporeal recognition of actors’ vulnerabilities drives ethical 
awareness of their shared needs, leading them to engage in relational and reciprocal interactions 
for the equal allocation (organizing in common), use (organizing of the common), and regeneration 
of their resources and communities (organizing for the common). From a feminist perspective of 
care, the proposed relational embodied ethics contributes to Pedersen’s (2010) principle of 
‘reciprocity in perpetuity’ by showing how care and responsibility for the other and for the use of 
common resources may be corporeally informed and sustained. We also build on Müller’s (2012) 
example to demonstrate how recognizing bodies’ shared vulnerabilities may enable reciprocity, 
relationality, and ethical decisions that sustain daily commoning practices. 
As well as linking feminist embodied ethics with Fournier’s (2013) three social pillars of 
commoning, our theory adds an ethical perspective of embodied relationality to Federici’s (2019) 
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political discussion of the commons. In doing so, the proposed approach accounts for the political 
struggles involved in commoning (Federici 2019), and considers these in conjunction with social 
actors’ localized, embodied ethical demands (Parker 2003). In discussing the political effect not 
only of individual but also of shared experiences of vulnerability in driving collective mobilization 
in the sphere of commoning, we also build on recent accounts that politicize the body (Rahmouni 
Eldirissi and Courpasson 2019; author/s). Our theorized ethical space emerges from actual 
corporeal experiences rather than idealized discourse (Rahmouni Eldirissi and Courpasson 2019); 
it is daily experienced through the body, shaping the social, ethical, and political processes of 
commoning, as illustrated in our examples. Below, we discuss the practical implications and 
potential applications of our theory to specific instances of commoning. 
Practical Implications and Applications of the Social Practices of Commoning 
On a practical level, we propose that relational embodied ethics may counteract the dehumanizing 
capitalistic tendencies that alienate bodies from each other and from their natural world (Müller 
2012) with complete disregard for their vulnerabilities (Federici 2019). In introducing this core 
but neglected perspective, we retheorize and reposition the ethical dilemmas of the commons by 
calling for the embodied work of maintenance to be made visible. Through relationality and 
reciprocity, this work sustains social structures under capitalism but is often unacknowledged and 
unrewarded. We argue that, as actors recognize that their relational processes of social 
reproduction are indispensable to overcoming their individual and shared vulnerabilities, they may 
begin to understand themselves as partial subjects relying on reciprocity and embodied 
relationality with others for their own and collective survival (Ettinger 2006). This understanding, 
we suggest, may enable a sense of belonging in their community, rather than of a collection of 
independent individuals brought together to perform alternative economic practices. In so doing, 
32 
it promises to alter capitalistic ways of thinking favoring individual benefit in commoning 
practices, and to enable consideration of all lives as equivalent, beyond gender and cultural 
differences (Federici 2004). By putting community needs at the center of ethical decision making 
(Federici 2019), such commoning alternatives offer the ethical possibility of countering tendencies 
to free ride, privately appropriate resources, and engage in asymmetric competition. Various 
initiatives follow this approach to ensure viable forms of community living, such as the Chikpo 
movement in India, the Zapatistas in Mexico, the Landless People’s movement of Brazil (MST), 
and the now defunct Rojava model (Tax 2016; for more examples, see Federici 2019). These 
examples also highlight the issue of scarcity, which is created though accumulation and inequality 
enabled by cut-throat competition. Below, we propose practical applications of our theory to 
specific instances of commoning. 
Urban Commons 
In the case of urban commons, we propose the development of social spaces, such as community 
gardens, camps, cooperative households, community accountability structures, and communal art 
and sport spaces, where social actors can meet periodically to exchange knowledge and engage in 
embodied interactions, including collective cooking, gardening, art classes, and political resistance 
marches. Our theory suggests that being body-to-body in such urban spaces allows social actors to 
see, touch and feel each other, to recognize their shared needs and vulnerabilities (Butler 2015), 
and to acknowledge their mutual interdependence on each other’s embodied contributions for 
community survival. These shared experiences might enhance a sense of community belonging 
and enable an embodied understanding of relationality and reciprocity to sustain collective social 
processes of allocation, shared use, and regeneration of urban commons and communities 
(Fournier 2013). For instance, Daskalaki et al. (2018) describe urban activities such as fairs, 
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bazaars, and assemblies, developing alongside grassroots exchange schemes where people 
collaborate and interact, as sustainable responses to the financial crisis and austerity in Greece. 
Notwithstanding the embodied nature of urban commoning practices, we acknowledge that other 
ethical theories may also be relevant and/or complementary in some cases, such as environmental 
ethics for urban reforestation practices. 
Digital Commons 
We also propose potential applications for digital communities, where human interactions are 
mediated mainly by technology, thereby promoting social alienation and reducing the sense of 
community belonging, and favoring individual benefit over community flourishing (Federici 
2019). We suggest that bringing people together periodically through communal gatherings for 
collective voting or social events might allow social actors to develop shared understandings of 
their actual vulnerabilities and shared needs (Butler 2015; Ettinger 2006) and realize their reliance 
on each other’s contributions to sustain digital communities. This realization might place 
community benefit above individual benefit, enabling relational and reciprocal online interactions 
that seek to sustain the social processes of allocation, use, and regeneration of digital commons 
and communities in the long term (Fournier 2013). However, we recognize that digital 
communities’ ethical concerns may also be addressed or complemented by other ethical 
approaches, such as post-human ethics or an ethics suited to the Infosphere (Greco and Floridi 
2004), that account for interactions between humans and technology. 
Last but not least, although our theory promises to overcome precarious forms of ‘inclusion 
in exclusion’ (Tyler 2018), the potential of exploitation present in commoning initiatives must not 
be ignored. We must accept the possibility of exploitative relations emerging from power 
asymmetries, which are bound to co-exist with collaboration, relationality, and reciprocity. 
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Understanding these dynamics might allow us not only to be open to the unknown foreign other 
and his/her irreducible otherness in commoning practices, but also to attend proactively to the 
problems of the commons identified by previous research. Such an approach is essential for 
rethinking our wellbeing in terms of community flourishing that enables sustainable development, 
rather than in terms of possessing commodities and calculating individual material wealth (Painter-
Morland et al. 2017). 
Limitations and Future Research 
While we argue for the potential of relational embodied ethics to propose meaningful alternatives 
to issues of viability surrounding commoning practices, we acknowledge that our theory has 
certain limitations. 
Specifically, we recognize that community sustenance may depend not only on community 
actors themselves, but also on civil society support, the state’s role in regulating the commons and 
enforcing enclosure, the effect of power asymmetries, and capitalistic or market logics. We have 
briefly discussed these tensions in the context of embodied ethics, but future research should 
extend these discussions. For instance, research might further examine alternatives that promote 
pluralist, non-hierarchical governance and eliminate coercion around the world, where self-
governed communities that promote diversity and equality struggle to sustain territorial and other 
forms of independence from the state. Furthermore, discussion of relationships between human 
and non-human actants, such as the material artifacts and technologically mediated processes often 
involved in commoning practices (Greco and Floridi 2004), is beyond the focus of this article. 
Future researchers might draw on related ethical perspectives, including post-human ethics and 
non-representational theories such as sociomateriality, radical materialist philosophy, or action-
network theory, combined with empirical material, to enhance understanding of how commoning 
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processes may emerge from interconnections between the embodied human subject and the 
material world. In addition, although we already depart from binary heteronormativity, future 
research might address new masculinities/femininities and hybrid forms of existence enabled by 
feminist embodied ethics. We also acknowledge that other ethical approaches may be more 
relevant to some instances of commoning, so we do not idealize embodied relational ethics as the 
only ethical avenue. Rather, in adopting this perspective, we call for further integration of the 
vulnerability of the human body into business ethics research. 
We hope that this approach might inspire future organizational researchers to advance 
theorization of the commons as a feminine or social organizing process, and to conduct empirical 
research on how feminist embodied ethics is concretely manifested in different contexts and 
practices of commoning, such as alternative currency-exchange schemes, environmental 
commoning, and commoning for urban regeneration. More importantly, we call for conceptual and 
empirical research that critically discusses individualism and focuses on interdependence as central 
to our lives in the global world. We believe that our work on the ‘bodies of the commons’ furthers 
this goal by highlighting that issues of shared corporeal vulnerability, relational, and reciprocal 
forms of community belonging can drive ethical and inclusive alternative forms of organizing. 
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